Hungarian electoral calculus
As if the EU hasn't got enough problems to worry about at the moment, the Fidesz government in Hungary is busy removing checks on its rule. It can do this because it achieved a two-thirds majority in parliament in the last election, which allows it to modify the constitution.
Hungary's electoral system is, to put it mildly, complex.There is a mixture of first-past-the-post seats and two types of PR, one of region list seats and another of "compensation seats" for runners-up in the first-past-the-post seats. Not to mention the two rounds of voting with three-candidate runoffs in the second round.
But have you ever wondered how such a bonkers system came in to being? Of course you have! Who hasn't? Certainly not Kenneth Benoit and John W. Schiemann, who wrote a paper about it: Bargaining Over Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law (PDF).
In summary, the major opposition parties sat round a table and hammered out a compromise between their favoured systems, which they then took to the communists who were forced to compromise their own intentions. Naturally all the parties were interested in a system that would maximise their own seat numbers. Hence peculiarities like the three-candidate runoff, which came about because the communists realised that a two-candidate round would consolidate the opposition against their candidates.
The result is something like splitting the difference between a PR system and a majoritarian system. Fidesz was by far the dominant party at the time of the 2010 election, receiving 53% of the vote, and so gaining 68% of the seats is not a massive distortion of the popular will. In the UK similar voting shares would have resulted in a far more dominant position for the winner.
Nevertheless, because the system has boosted their seats past the two-thirds magic number, Fidesz have evidently decided that they have a special mandate to reshape the Hungarian constitution for their own benefit. Unsurprisingly this includes changing electoral law to suit themselves.
The public apparently disagree about their mandate, with recent polls showing them dropping to 20-25% of the vote. Presumably the thinking behind the two-thirds requirement is that there should be a broad consensus for changes to the institution, which is clearly not the case for the changes Fidesz are making. That smallish distortion in seats has resulted in a massive distortion of power.
Moral: letting a committee of politicians design their own electoral system isn't a very good idea.
Hungary's electoral system is, to put it mildly, complex.There is a mixture of first-past-the-post seats and two types of PR, one of region list seats and another of "compensation seats" for runners-up in the first-past-the-post seats. Not to mention the two rounds of voting with three-candidate runoffs in the second round.
But have you ever wondered how such a bonkers system came in to being? Of course you have! Who hasn't? Certainly not Kenneth Benoit and John W. Schiemann, who wrote a paper about it: Bargaining Over Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law (PDF).
In summary, the major opposition parties sat round a table and hammered out a compromise between their favoured systems, which they then took to the communists who were forced to compromise their own intentions. Naturally all the parties were interested in a system that would maximise their own seat numbers. Hence peculiarities like the three-candidate runoff, which came about because the communists realised that a two-candidate round would consolidate the opposition against their candidates.
The result is something like splitting the difference between a PR system and a majoritarian system. Fidesz was by far the dominant party at the time of the 2010 election, receiving 53% of the vote, and so gaining 68% of the seats is not a massive distortion of the popular will. In the UK similar voting shares would have resulted in a far more dominant position for the winner.
Nevertheless, because the system has boosted their seats past the two-thirds magic number, Fidesz have evidently decided that they have a special mandate to reshape the Hungarian constitution for their own benefit. Unsurprisingly this includes changing electoral law to suit themselves.
The public apparently disagree about their mandate, with recent polls showing them dropping to 20-25% of the vote. Presumably the thinking behind the two-thirds requirement is that there should be a broad consensus for changes to the institution, which is clearly not the case for the changes Fidesz are making. That smallish distortion in seats has resulted in a massive distortion of power.
Moral: letting a committee of politicians design their own electoral system isn't a very good idea.
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